The ambitious era of the Phoenix Suns, marked by their pursuit of a `superteam,` has officially concluded. This period, initiated by new owner Mat Ishbia`s aggressive acquisitions of stars like Kevin Durant and Bradley Beal to join Devin Booker, ultimately failed to deliver on its grand promise. Despite accumulating players with a combined 16 All-Star selections and investing heavily, the trio never truly harmonized on the court.
The Suns managed to win only a single playoff series during this time – a first-round victory in 2023 against the LA Clippers, notably before Beal`s arrival. With Beal on the roster, Phoenix astonishingly failed to win a single playoff game, suffering a first-round sweep in 2024 and missing the playoffs entirely in 2025. Now, the stars have dispersed: Durant has moved to the Houston Rockets, and Beal, following a contract buyout, is set to join the LA Clippers. Devin Booker remains the sole foundational star, reminiscent of the pre-2021 Suns.
This article examines the four key factors behind the rapid and disappointing end to Phoenix`s high-profile venture.
1. Underwhelming Performance
The Suns` primary issues were twofold: player availability and, even when their three stars were present, a consistent mediocrity. Various injuries, predominantly to Bradley Beal (who hadn`t played more than 53 games in a season since 2020-21), severely limited the trio`s time on the court. Across two seasons, Durant, Beal, and Booker shared the floor for just 78 regular-season games and four playoff games, achieving a 45-37 record in those matchups. To put this in perspective, a 45-37 record would have placed them ninth in the Western Conference last season and eleventh the season before, indicating that even at full strength, the Suns resembled a lower-tier play-in team rather than an elite contender.
Overall, the Suns, with their three stars, finished with a regular season record of 85-79 and an abysmal 0-4 in the playoffs, totaling an 85-83 composite record. They were outscored by 55 points (a net +5 in the regular season but a staggering -60 in the playoffs). In essence, the Suns were merely an average NBA team with Booker, Durant, and Beal, despite paying for a significantly higher caliber of performance.
2. Lack of Superstar Synergy
The most successful NBA superstar pairings feature players whose diverse skill sets complement each other, creating a collective impact greater than the sum of their individual talents. Examples include Kevin Garnett protecting the paint for Paul Pierce and Ray Allen, or Stephen Curry and Draymond Green elevating each other through pick-and-roll dynamics.
The rationale behind acquiring Beal was to supercharge the Suns` offense to historic levels alongside Booker and Durant, while also providing stability when other stars rested. However, neither of these effects materialized. Phoenix`s stars struggled to complement each other because their skills largely overlapped without introducing new dimensions to the team`s play.
According to PBP Stats, when Booker and Durant played without Beal over the past two regular seasons, the Suns` offensive rating was 120.5 points per 100 possessions. Remarkably, when Beal joined that duo, the team`s offensive rating remained precisely at 120.5. Beal had no discernible positive offensive impact when sharing the court with Phoenix`s top two stars, and paradoxically, the Suns` defense worsened with him on the floor.
Furthermore, lineups featuring Booker alone performed better than those with both Booker and Beal. Similarly, lineups with Durant alone were more effective than those with Durant and Beal. Lineups comprised solely of Beal, without either Booker or Durant, managed only 111.5 points per 100 possessions, an output equivalent to a bottom-10 NBA offense.
Lineups | Off. Rating |
---|---|
Booker, Durant, Beal | 120.5 |
Booker, Durant | 120.5 |
Booker | 118.2 |
Booker, Beal | 113.4 |
Durant | 119.8 |
Durant, Beal | 113.4 |
Beal | 111.5 |
While Beal`s individual statistics as a Sun appear adequate, with 17.6 points per game on solid efficiency and 41% from three-point range (a drop from his 32% usage rate in Washington to 22% in Phoenix), these contributions ultimately proved to be “empty calories.” They did nothing to elevate the Suns` standing in the increasingly competitive Western Conference. By this measure, his addition would have been disappointing even if his colossal contract had not placed the Suns in the NBA`s most precarious financial position.
3. Excessive Financial Outlay
With enthusiastic support from owner Mat Ishbia, the Suns committed an astounding amount of money, leading the league in total payroll over the past two seasons. According to an analysis of Spotrac data, Phoenix spent a staggering $626 million on salaries and luxury tax payments. This figure was $51 million more than the second-highest spending team, the Golden State Warriors. This calculation also excludes the non-financial penalties faced by Phoenix due to the league`s new cap rules for teams exceeding the second apron.
Even more striking is the lack of success that this enormous investment yielded. Every other team among the top eleven spenders over the last two campaigns managed to win at least one playoff game during that period – a feat the Suns failed to achieve. Phoenix nearly doubled the spending of the next team that won zero playoff games; the New Orleans Pelicans spent $336 million, which is $290 million less than Phoenix.
Most of the NBA`s highest-spending teams typically see a return on their investment in the form of more wins, as struggling teams are not incentivized to delve deeper into the luxury tax. However, as the accompanying data illustrates, Phoenix stands out starkly on the graph comparing spending to playoff success over the last two seasons.
4. Catastrophic Trades
To assemble their desired superteam with Booker, Durant, and Beal, the Suns not only went all-in financially but also strategically, by mortgaging their future with the most valuable currency in NBA trades: draft picks.
In total, the acquisitions of Durant and Beal cost the Suns five first-round picks, five pick swaps, along with key players Mikal Bridges, Cameron Johnson, and Chris Paul. These three players, in turn, collectively brought back seven additional first-round picks plus a swap when their new teams later traded them.
Aggregating these assets, the Suns effectively paid a price equivalent to 12 first-round picks and six swaps for Durant and Beal. Consequently, the team does not control any of its own first-round picks until 2032. (While this math might be slightly inflated, as Bridges, for example, wasn`t worth five first-round picks on his own in 2023 but became so a year later, and other teams absorbed large contracts, the overall cost for Durant and Beal remains staggering.)
“We do those things a 100 out of a 100 times, not 99 out of a 100, a 100 out of a 100,” Mat Ishbia stated to Baxter Holmes last year. “And we still do `em again. And I think the other 29 GMs would all do the exact same thing.”
However, when the Suns moved on from Durant and Beal this summer, their return was meager: just one first-round pick (used on center Khaman Maluach at No. 10), Jalen Green, Dillon Brooks, and a marginal increase in financial flexibility.
The outcome is a team with minimal present-day talent beyond Devin Booker, virtually no future assets, and the stark reminders of a disastrous recent past. Just three years ago, the Suns held a 2-0 lead in the NBA Finals, a mere two victories away from the franchise`s inaugural championship. Now, they face what might be the bleakest long-term outlook in the entire league.